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THE BOUNDLESS WAR: CHALLENGING THE
NOTION OF A GLOBAL ARMED CONFLICT
AGAINST AL-QAEDA AND ITS AFFILIATES
Andrew Beshai∗
The U.S. military response to the 9/11 attacks has expanded into
a “global war” without a definite geographic scope. Both the Bush and
Obama administrations have executed attacks in several countries
including Somalia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Yemen under the
“global war” paradigm. This Article challenges the concept of a global
armed conflict, instead favoring the “epicenter-of-hostilities”
framework for determining the legality of military action against
Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and other terrorist groups. This approach,
rooted in established international law, measures the existence of
specific criteria in each nation where hostile forces are present to
determine if an armed conflict in that country is legally permissible. If
such criteria are met, then the United States may engage in the conflict
in that country under the laws of armed conflict. However, if such
criteria are not satisfied, then the United States is limited to only law
enforcement operations in that region. The “global war” paradigm has
many negative consequences and does not adequately consider the
nature of non-state actors involved in an armed conflict scattered
throughout multiple countries. Shifting the basis for U.S. military
actions away from a global war paradigm toward a more focused
inquiry as to the presence and conduct of terrorist groups within a
specific nation will ensure compliance with established international
law and set a strong precedent in this developing and uncertain space.

∗ J.D. Candidate, May 2015, Loyola Law School, Los Angeles; M.Ed., University of
Nevada, Las Vegas; B.A. English Literature, University of California, Irvine. I would like to
thank Professor David Glazier for his guidance and feedback throughout the writing process. And
thank you to the editors and staffers of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review for their work on
this Issue.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The violent sound of a missile pierced the placid sky,
descending rapidly onto the field below.1 Through dense billows of
smoke, villagers approached the wreckage and discovered the body
of Mamana Bibi, an elderly woman who had been gathering
vegetables with her grandchildren when the missile decimated the
field around them.2 Reports indicate that she was killed by a drone
strike launched by the United States.3 Recently, Bibi’s son and
grandchildren testified before Congress, describing the events in
harrowing detail and demanding an explanation for the death of the
family matriarch.4 Their testimony was a cry for help from a family
caught in the crossfire of the United States’ conflict with al-Qaeda
and its affiliates.
What began as an attack on Manhattan and Washington, D.C. by
a terrorist group in Afghanistan has expanded into a “global war”
raining death on individuals in rural areas of Pakistan, Yemen, and
Somalia. Assuming the United States was, and remains, entitled to
use force in response to the 9/11 attacks, what is the permissible
geographic scope of this conflict? This Article disputes the United
States’ classification of the fight against al-Qaeda and its affiliates as
a global armed conflict, and instead looks to existing international
law to provide the proper contours of the conflict and govern the
spread of the fight. To that end, this Article proposes a new
approach, the “epicenter-of-hostilities” framework, to clearly
delineate the limits of the current conflict and ensure that the
expansion of the fight against al-Qaeda and its affiliates is consistent
with international law.
The events of September 11, 2001, in which al-Qaeda operatives
hijacked four commercial jets and attacked the World Trade Center
and the Pentagon, ignited the current conflict. The international
1. Amnesty Int’l, “Will I Be Next?” US Drone Strikes in Pakistan, ASA 33/013/2013, at
19–20 (Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Pakistan Drone Report], available at http://www.amnestyusa
.org/sites/default/files/asa330132013en.pdf.
2. Id.
3. Karen McVeigh, Drone Strikes: Tears in Congress as Pakistani Family Tells of
Mother’s Death, GUARDIAN, Oct. 29, 2013, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/oct/29
/pakistan-family-drone-victim-testimony-congress.
4. Id.

832

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:829

community responded by recognizing these events as an armed
attack,5 and the United States commenced hostilities against the
al-Qaeda organization and the Taliban government of Afghanistan.6
President George W. Bush, however, characterized the conflict as a
global “war on terror” and declared that the war extended to “every
terrorist group of global reach.”7
When Barack Obama became president in 2009, it appeared that
the United States would take a new approach in the conflict.8 Early
into his presidential tenure, President Obama retracted the incendiary
rhetoric of his predecessor; instead, his administration has
characterized the conflict as “an armed conflict with al-Qaeda as well
as the Taliban and associated forces” and committed itself to comply
with the Geneva Conventions and other relevant rules of
international law.9 However, despite President Obama’s attempts to
distance his administration from the “global war” paradigm espoused
by President Bush, he ultimately expanded the scope of hostilities to
include places such as Somalia10 and drastically increased the
number of drone strikes in Pakistan11 and Yemen.12

5. One day after 9/11, the United Nations Security Council recognized the United States’
right of self-defense. See S.C. Res. 1368, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) [hereinafter
U.N. Security Council Resolution]. In subsequent years, the Security Council continued to
recognize the existence of the United States’ “Operation Enduring Freedom” in Afghanistan. See
S.C. Res. 1776, ¶¶ 5, 25, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1776 (Sept. 19, 2007).
6. BARBARA SALAZAR TORREON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42738, INSTANCES OF USE
OF UNITED STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798–2013, at 22 (2013), available at http://fas.org
/sgp/crs/natsec/R42738.pdf.
7. George W. Bush, U.S. President, Speech to Joint Session of Congress and the Nation
(Sept. 20, 2001) [hereinafter Bush Speech], available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpsrv
/nation/specials/attacked/transcripts/bushaddress_092001.html.
8. See Barack H. Obama, U.S. President, A Just and Lasting Peace, Nobel Lecture
(Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter Obama Nobel Speech] (“I believe the United States of America must
remain a standard bearer in the conduct of war . . . . That is why I prohibited torture. That is why I
ordered the prison at Guantanamo Bay closed. And that is why I have reaffirmed America’s
commitment to abide by the Geneva Conventions.”).
9. Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Dep’t of State, Speech at Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law (Mar. 25, 2010).
10. Mark Mazzetti & Eric Schmitt, U.S. Expands Its Drone War Into Somalia, N.Y. TIMES,
July 1, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/02/world/africa/02somalia.html?pagewanted=all.
11. Pakistan Drone Report, supra note 1, at 12.
12. Human Rights Watch, Between a Drone and Al-Qaeda: The Civilian Cost of US
Targeted Killings in Yemen, ISBN: 978-1-62313-0701, at 3 (Oct. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Yemen
Drone Report]; see also Bill Roggio & Bob Barry, Charting the Data for US Air Strikes in
Yemen, 2002–2013, LONG WAR J. (Nov. 29, 2013, 11:54 AM), http://www.longwarjournal.org
/multimedia/Yemen/code/Yemen-strike.php (featuring a chart visually displaying the increase of
airstrikes in Yemen since President Obama took office).
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This Article challenges the notion of a global armed conflict
against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The problem with the “global
war” paradigm is that waging a conflict that spans several national
borders against a non-state actor and its affiliates does not fit within
the established categories of armed conflict under international law.
Additionally, adoption of the “global war” paradigm may lead to
adverse consequences, such as fewer protections for innocent
civilians, potential prosecution of American soldiers, and the risk of
targeting “affiliated” groups that are completely disconnected from
the core al-Qaeda group that attacked the United States on
September 11.
This Article proposes a framework, rooted in existing law, to
address the legal challenges posed by the “global war” paradigm.
The epicenter-of-hostilities framework seeks to disaggregate the
conflict against al-Qaeda and its affiliates and ensure that there is an
independent legal basis for waging an armed conflict against each
group. This is accomplished by analyzing each country where the
conflict is occurring to determine if the legal criteria for armed
conflict are satisfied. If the conditions in a certain country provide an
independent legal basis to conduct an armed conflict, then it is an
epicenter-of-hostilities, and the United States may proceed pursuant
to the international law governing armed conflict. However, if the
requisite legal criteria are not satisfied in a particular nation, then the
United States may not legally engage in armed conflict within that
country but is instead limited to law enforcement operations.
Part II provides background describing the law of armed conflict
(LOAC)—the specific subset of international law rules that apply in
cases of armed conflict.13 Part II will further explain the two types of
armed conflict currently recognized within LOAC: international
armed conflicts (IAC) and non-international armed conflicts
(NIAC).14
Part III argues that the United States’ monolithic notion of a
broad armed conflict against “al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated
forces” is legally flawed because international law does not
13. LOAC is also referred to as the law of war or international humanitarian law, but this
Article will use the term LOAC. See INT’L LAW ASS’N, FINAL REPORT ON THE MEANING OF
ARMED CONFLICT IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 8 (2010), available at http://www.ila-hq.org
/download.cfm/docid/2176DC63-D268-4133-8989A664754F9F87.
14. Infra Part II.B.
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recognize an armed conflict against a non-state actor and its affiliates
scattered across the globe.15 Additionally, Part III discusses several
adverse consequences of the “global war” paradigm.16
Part IV proposes a framework that conforms to international law
to address this challenge: the epicenter-of-hostilities approach.17
Under the epicenter-of-hostilities approach, the overall conflict
against al-Qaeda and its affiliates will be disaggregated into its
constituent countries to ensure that there is an independent legal
basis for engaging in armed conflict against each group. This part
will illustrate this framework by examining the conflict zones in
Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia to determine if each
nation independently satisfies the requisite criteria for armed
conflict.18
Finally, Part V discusses the implications of the framework
presented in this Article.19 First, it will ensure that the United States’
actions conform to international law, thereby enhancing its image on
the international stage. Second, this framework will affect the United
States’ conduct proceeding against other groups that may choose to
affiliate with al-Qaeda. Third, because this type of armed conflict
against a transnational, non-state actor is entirely new on the
international stage, the United States has an important role in shaping
the future development of customary international law and affecting
other states’ conduct in future conflicts.
II. BACKGROUND
To fully understand the salient issues implicated in the current
conflict, it is important to locate the conflict within the larger context
of international law. To that end, this section provides a concise
overview of the specific subset of rules applicable in LOAC and
concludes with a brief discussion of the two types of conflict
currently recognized under international law.

15.
16.
17.
18.
19.

Infra Part III.A.
Infra Part III.B.
Infra Part IV.A.
Infra Parts IV.A.1–4.
Infra Part V.
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A. The Law of Armed Conflict
The two bodies of international law most pertinent to the
analysis of the conflict against al-Qaeda are LOAC20 and
international human rights law (IHRL).21 Both LOAC and IHRL are
directly applicable during times of armed conflict; however, when
the two bodies of law conflict, LOAC takes priority pursuant to the
principle of lex specialis,22 which dictates that the specialized rules
prevail over the general rules.23 For instance, IHRL and LOAC
contain different provisions concerning the right to liberty.24 Under
IHRL, individuals may not be arrested or detained arbitrarily, must
be provided with due process, and must be informed of the charges
against them.25 The provisions for detention under LOAC are more
lenient for states: combatants may be detained without charge for the
duration of hostilities,26 and civilians may be interned as long as they

20. The main treaties governing LOAC are the Hague Conventions and the Geneva
Conventions. See Hague Convention (V) Respecting the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and
Persons During War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2310 [hereinafter Hague Convention];
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter Geneva
Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85
[hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949,
6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV] [hereinafter collectively
Geneva Conventions]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of
12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II].
21. The major treaty governing IHRL is the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights. See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A (XXI), U.N.
Doc. A/6316, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976)
[hereinafter ICCPR].
22. Natasha Balendra, Defining Armed Conflict, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2461, 2482 (2008).
23. Marco Sassoli & Laura M. Olson, The Relationship Between International Humanitarian
Law and Human Rights Law Where it Matters: Admissible Killing and Internment of Fighters in
Non-International Armed Conflicts, 90 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 599, 603 (2008).
24. Id. at 601.
25. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 9.
26. Geneva Convention III, supra note 20, art. 21 (“The Detaining Power may subject
prisoners of war to internment. It may impose on them the obligation of not leaving, beyond
certain limits, the camp where they are interned, or if the said camp is fenced in, of not going
outside its perimeter.”).
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pose a security threat to the detaining power.27 Pursuant to the
principle of lex specialis, the LOAC rules governing detention would
displace the IHRL rules during an armed conflict; however, during
peace time, the IHRL detention rules would apply.28
The same friction occurs with respect to the right to life.
According to IHRL, individuals have an inherent right to life, which
cannot be deprived arbitrarily.29 In contrast, LOAC permits states
engaged in warfare to kill enemy combatants at any time in the
course of armed conflict; furthermore, civilians may be killed as long
as they are directly participating in hostilities.30 In an armed conflict,
the LOAC rules governing lethal force would supersede IHRL rules
according to lex specialis.31
Of course, to trigger the provisions of LOAC, there must be a
legally recognized armed conflict. According to the United Nations
(U.N.) Charter, states are to “refrain in their international relations
from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or
political independence of any state . . . .”32 There is an exception to
this rule, found in Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, allowing states to
resort to force for individual or collective self-defense “if an armed
attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations . . . .”33 This
same language is repeated in the North Atlantic Treaty, which states:
The Parties [of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization]
agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in
Europe or North America shall be considered an attack
against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an
armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right
of individual or collective self-defence recognised by
Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist
the Party or Parties so attacked . . .34

27. Geneva Convention IV, supra note 20, art. 42 (“The internment or placing in assigned
residence of protected persons may be ordered only if the security of the Detaining Power makes
it absolutely necessary.”).
28. Sassoli & Olson, supra note 23, at 603–04.
29. ICCPR, supra note 21, art. 6.
30. Additional Protocol II, supra note 20, art. 13.
31. Sassoli & Olson, supra note 23, at 601–04.
32. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 4.
33. Id. art. 51 (emphasis added).
34. North Atlantic Treaty art. 5, Apr. 4, 1949, 63 Stat. 2241, 34 U.N.T.S. 243 (emphasis
added).
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As evidenced by the U.N. Charter and the NATO treaty, an armed
attack is a requisite condition before a nation may declare a state of
armed conflict and trigger the provisions of LOAC.
B. International v. Non-International Armed Conflict
Within LOAC, there is a further distinction between
international armed conflicts (IAC) and non-international armed
conflicts (NIAC). Both are governed by treaties, such as the Geneva
and Hague Conventions,35 and customary international law.36 IACs
are conflicts occurring between two or more states.37 NIACs are
conflicts between a state and a non-state actor occurring within the
boundary of a single state.38 Because of states’ reluctance to allow
international regulation of their domestic affairs, NIAC is a more
recently recognized species of armed conflict.39 Consequently, the
treaty law and customary international law regulating NIACs are not
as comprehensive as those governing IACs.40
An examination of the two major treaty provisions governing
NIACs, Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and
Additional Protocol II, demonstrates that NIACs were intended to be

35. For a more exhaustive list of the numerous treaties governing armed conflicts, see THE
JOINT DOCTRINE AND CONCEPTS CTR., U.K. MINISTRY OF DEF., THE JOINT SERVICE MANUAL
OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 7–18 (2004) [hereinafter MANUAL ON LOAC], available at
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/27874/JSP383200
4Edition.pdf.
36. Customary international law is a set of rules that have become legally binding on all
states as a result of state practice over a period of time. A rule of customary international law is
created when there is extensive and uniform state practice accompanied by opinio juris—a belief
by states that they have an obligation or a right to engage in a particular practice. Id. at 5. For a
more comprehensive study of customary international law in armed conflict, see Jean-Marie
Henckaerts, Study on Customary International Humanitarian Law: A Contribution to the
Understanding and Respect for the Rule of Law in Armed Conflict, 87 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
857 (2005).
37. Geneva Conventions, supra note 20, art. 2 (“[T]he present Convention shall apply to all
cases of declared war or of any other armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the
High Contracting Parties . . . .”) (emphasis added).
38. See id. art. 3.
39. See Oscar M. Unler, et al., COMMENTARY ON THE GENEVA CONVENTION IV RELATIVE
TO THE PROTECTION OF CIVILIAN PERSONS IN TIME OF WAR 31 (Jean S. Pictet ed., 1958)
[hereinafter GENEVA COMMENTARY].
40. In IAC, all of the Geneva provisions apply. However, in NIAC, only Common Article 3
to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and Additional Protocol II apply. INT’L INST. OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW, THE MANUAL ON THE LAW OF NON-INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICT
2–3 (2006) (“Express treaty law governing non-international armed conflict is rather limited.”).
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internal conflicts confined to the boundaries of a single state.41
Common Article 3 begins with a statement framing the scope of its
application: “In the case of armed conflict not of an international
character occurring in the territory of one of the High Contracting
Parties . . . .”42 Similarly, Additional Protocol II begins with a
similar provision setting out the scope of its application: “This
Protocol . . . shall apply to all armed conflicts . . . which take place in
the territory of a High Contracting Party between its armed forces
and dissident armed forces or other organized armed groups . . . .”43
Thus, the text of the two major treaty provisions governing NIAC
unambiguously states that these conflicts were meant to be restricted
to the territory of a single state.
NIAC is distinguished from sporadic acts of domestic violence,
which are neither considered armed conflict nor governed by
LOAC.44 The threshold to determine the existence of NIAC was
originally set forth in the landmark decision, Prosecutor v. Tadic.45
Issued by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), the Tadic decision established that the existence
of NIAC requires “protracted armed violence” (“intensity”) and the
presence of “organized armed groups” (“organization”).46 Although
the decision is not directly binding on states, it is widely regarded as
an accurate statement of current customary international law
applicable to both IAC and NIAC.47 In fact, the Tadic criteria have

41. The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties contains the official guidelines to
interpret treaties. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 33 (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning
to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.”)
(emphasis added).
42. Geneva Conventions, supra note 20, art. 3 (emphasis added).
43. Additional Protocol II, supra note 20, art. 1(1) (emphasis added); INTERNATIONAL
COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE
1977 TO THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949 ¶ 4384 (Yves Sandoz et al. eds., 1987)
(stating that Additional Protocol II would apply in all situations of non-international armed
conflict in the sense of [Common] Article 3).
44. MANUAL ON LOAC, supra note 35, at 385.
45. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for Interlocutory
Appeal on Jurisdiction (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2, 1995).
46. Id. ¶ 70.
47. See INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 13, at 1–2; MANUAL ON LOAC, supra note 35, at 29.
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even been codified in the Rome Statute, emphasizing their prominent
role in LOAC.48
Subsequent ICTY decisions have provided guidelines for
determining whether the criteria of intensity and organization have
been satisfied. Conditions that tend to indicate sufficient intensity
include: “Seriousness of attacks . . . spread of clashes over territory
and over a period of time . . . type of weapons used . . . the extent of
destruction . . . and the number of casualties caused by shelling or
fighting.”49 When analyzing the organization criterion, the court
considered the following factors:
The existence of a command structure and disciplinary
rules . . . ability to plan, coordinate, and carry out military
operations . . . ability to define a unified military
strategy . . . and [ability] to speak with one voice and
negotiate and conclude agreements such as cease-fire and
peace accords.50
One of the major differences between IAC and NIAC is the
combatant’s privilege, which immunizes soldiers in armed conflict
from facing prosecution under an enemy state’s domestic laws. It is a
crucial aspect of armed conflict because without it soldiers would be
subject to prosecution for violation of any domestic law, including,
of course, the killing of enemy soldiers and the destruction of
military objects.51 In IAC, the combatant’s privilege derives from the
Hague Land Warfare Rules, which sets forth the following criteria to
receive immunity: (1) being commanded by a person responsible for
his subordinates; (2) having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance; (3) carrying arms openly; and (4) conducting operations in
accordance with the laws and customs of war.52 In contrast, states

48. The Rome Statute created the International Criminal Court and established four core
international crimes: genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3.
49. Prosecutor v. Boskoski & Tarculvoski, Case No. IT-04-82-T, Judgment, ¶ 177 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia July 10, 2008).
50. Prosecutor v. Haradinaj, Case No. IT-04-84-T, Judgment, ¶ 60 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the
Former Yugoslavia Apr. 3, 2008).
51. Joseph P. Bialke, Al-Qaeda & Taliban Unlawful Combatant Detainees, Unlawful
Belligerency, and the International Laws of Armed Conflict, 55 A.F. L. REV. 1, 9 (2004) (“If a
combatant follows [LOAC] during war, ‘combatant’s privilege’ applies and the combatant is
immune from prosecution for lawful combat activities.”).
52. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex to the
Convention: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 1, Oct. 18,
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deliberately crafted the rules governing NIAC without any express
treaty provision to grant non-state actors the combatant’s privilege or
prisoner of war status.53 The reason for this difference between IACs
and NIACs is that states wanted their own domestic laws to govern
treatment of their adversaries, allowing states to prosecute non-state
actors in NIAC as mere criminals under domestic law.54
Because the United States has chosen to construe the conflict
with al-Qaeda and its affiliates as an armed conflict, the United
States must comply with existing international law. If the United
States wishes to benefit from the broad powers granted to states
during armed conflict, it must also respect the limitations imposed on
states by the international law governing armed conflicts.
III. ANALYSIS
This section analyzes the “global war” paradigm under LOAC to
argue that there is no legal basis for a global conflict against
al-Qaeda and its affiliates. The section closes with several adverse
consequences that result from the “global war” paradigm.
A. Legal Problems with the “Global War” Paradigm
The problem with the “global war” paradigm is that it does not
fit within the established definitions of armed conflict under LOAC,
making it difficult to ascertain the extent or geographical limits of
the conflict. The conflict against al-Qaeda and its affiliates is not
IAC because it is not conducted between two states.55 Nor is the
conflict NIAC, because it is not confined to the territory of a single
state even though it involves a state battling a non-state actor.56
Instead of providing a clear picture of how the United States is
1907, 36 Stat. 2277. These same requirements are repeated in the Third Geneva Convention as
the criteria for prisoner of war status. Geneva Convention III, supra note 20, art. 4.
53. Neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II contains any provisions for
combatant’s privilege in NIAC.
54. GENEVA COMMENTARY, supra note 39, at 44 (“Consequently, the fact of applying
Article 3 . . . does not limit in any way the Government’s right to suppress a rebellion by all the
means—including arms—provided by its own laws; nor does it in any way affect that
Government’s right to prosecute, try and sentence its adversaries for their crimes, according to its
own laws.”).
55. Geneva Conventions, supra note 20, art. 2.
56. Geneva Conventions, supra note 20, art. 3. The United States has engaged with al-Qaeda
and its affiliates in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Somalia, and Yemen, which means the conflict against
al-Qaeda and its affiliates cannot properly be classified as NIAC, as it spans several national
borders. Supra Part II.B.
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conducting this conflict within the constraints of LOAC, both the
Bush and Obama administrations have failed to articulate a coherent
legal position about the scope of the conflict that complies with
existing international law.
Originally, the international community recognized the events of
9/11 as an armed attack giving rise to the United States’ right of
self-defense under Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.57 This right of
self-defense was limited to those groups responsible for the 9/11
attacks58: al-Qaeda, the organization that had orchestrated the
attacks, and the Taliban, which had harbored and supported
al-Qaeda.59 In October 2001, the Bush administration launched
Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan against al-Qaeda
and the Taliban government, and posited that the unconventional
conflict fell outside the bounds of current international law.60 In fact,
President Bush initiated the “global war” rhetoric by proclaiming
that the conflict was a concerted effort to “defeat . . . the global terror
network.”61 He reiterated this notion at the outset of OEF by
referring to the hostilities in Afghanistan as a “campaign against
terrorism.”62
The first effort to legally classify the conflict with al-Qaeda
occurred in 2006, when the Supreme Court, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
held that the United States was engaged in an NIAC against
al-Qaeda.63 The Supreme Court reached this decision primarily on
the basis that al-Qaeda, a non-state actor, was engaged in armed
conflict with the United States, a state, but the Supreme Court did not
address the legally permissible scope of the conflict.64 While the
Obama administration has purported to accept the Supreme Court’s

57. U.N. Security Council Resolution, supra note 5; Press Release, NATO, Statement by the
North Atlantic Council (Sept. 12, 2001), available at http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2001/p01
-124e.htm.
58. U.N. Security Council Resolution, supra note 5.
59. Koh, supra note 9.
60. Memorandum for the Vice President et al., Humane Treatment of al-Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002) [hereinafter Bush Memo] (“[N]one of the provisions of Geneva apply to
our conflict with al-Qaeda in Afghanistan or elsewhere throughout the world because, among
other reasons, al-Qaeda is not a High Contracting Party to Geneva.”).
61. Bush Speech, supra note 7.
62. Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Combat Action in Afghanistan Against Al
Qaida Terrorists and Their Taliban Supporters, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1211, 1211–12 (Oct. 9, 2001).
63. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 629–31 (2006).
64. Id.
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classification of the conflict with al-Qaeda as NIAC,65 the
administration’s conduct has been paradoxical, extending the conflict
to target affiliated groups in various countries outside Afghanistan66
and confirming a “war against al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated
forces.”67 What the Obama administration has failed to recognize is
that NIACs are confined to the boundaries of a single state,68
meaning that the United States may not rely on the NIAC as a legal
basis to attack affiliated groups outside the boundaries of
Afghanistan.
Several scholars have advanced arguments rooted in existing
law, claiming that the current NIAC may be used as a legal premise
to extend the conflict against affiliated groups beyond the borders of
Afghanistan.69 However, these legal arguments are rife with
problems.
Some have argued that if there is an NIAC occurring within a
state, the expansion of that armed conflict should not be governed by
geography but rather by the status of the parties involved.70 Echoing
this rationale, former State Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh,
has argued that a transnational conflict between a state and a
non-state actor may meet the definition of NIAC regardless of where
the fighting occurs.71 Applied to the conflict with al-Qaeda, this
65. Jeh Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel, U.S. Dep’t of Def., The Conflict Against al-Qaeda
and Affiliates: How Will It End?, Speech at the Oxford Union (Nov. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/11/jeh-johnson-speech-at-the-oxford-union/ (“In 2006, our
Supreme Court also endorsed the view that the United States is in an armed conflict . . . . We
detain those who are part of al-Qaeda, but in a manner consistent with Common Article 3 of the
Geneva Conventions and all other applicable law.”) (emphasis added); Koh, supra note 9
(acknowledging the applicability of Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II to the conflict
against al-Qaeda).
66. The Obama administration has drastically increased the use of drones in Yemen and
Pakistan as well as expanding the conflict into Somalia. Infra Part IV.
67. Barack H. Obama, U.S. President, Remarks at the National Defense University,
Washington, D.C. (May 23, 2013) [hereinafter Obama National Security Speech] (“Moreover,
America’s actions are legal. We were attacked on 9/11. Within a week, Congress overwhelmingly
authorized the use of force. Under domestic law, and international law, the United States is at war
with al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and their associated forces.”).
68. Supra Part II.B.
69. See Koh, supra note 9.
70. This view was expressed by John Dehn in a debate with Kevin Jon Heller. John C. Dehn
& Kevin Jon Heller, Targeted Killing: The Case of Anwar Al-Aulaqi, 159 U. PA. L. REV.
PENNUMBRA 175, 190 (2011) (“The key to the applicability of [LOAC] is not the location of the
attack, but the status of the attacker and target.”).
71. Harold Hongju Koh, Professor, Yale Law School, How to End the Forever War?, Speech
at the Oxford Union (May 7, 2013), available at http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf
/Faculty/KohOxfordSpeech.pdf (“But September 11 made clear that the term ‘non-international
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interpretation would allow the United States to attack any militants
affiliated with al-Qaeda regardless of their geographic location by
predicating that attack on the existence of NIAC in Afghanistan.72
While this legal theory would justify the actions of the United States,
it is problematic because it departs substantially from the intended
scope of NIAC dictated by Common Article 3 and Additional
Protocol II.73 Moreover, this position would unduly extend the armed
conflict into locations that had remained conflict-free, permitting the
United States to engage in conduct pursuant to LOAC, which
contains more lenient provisions for the use of lethal force, rather
than IHRL.74 For example, LOAC provides authority to kill civilians
as long as their deaths are not disproportionate to the military
advantage to be gained, while IHRL does not contain such a
provision; thus, adopting this position results in fewer protections for
innocent civilians.75
Other scholars, premising their arguments on the law of
neutrality, contend that al-Qaeda affiliates in countries outside
Afghanistan have breached their duties of neutrality by aligning with
and furthering al-Qaeda’s agenda.76 Pursuant to the law of neutrality,
these affiliated groups in other territories would be considered
co-belligerents, and the United States would be permitted to use
force against them.77 According to the law of neutrality, neutral
states not involved in a conflict have a duty to refrain from providing
support or allowing their territories to be used for operations by any
party to a conflict.78 If a state violates these duties and assists a party

armed conflicts’ can include transnational battles that are not between nations: for example,
between a nation-state (the United States) and the transnational non state armed group (al-Qaeda)
that attacked it.”). Koh made these comments in his personal capacity after he resigned his post at
the Department of State and returned to academia. Id.
72. See Robert Chesney, Who May Be Killed? Anwar al-Awlaki as a Case Study in the
International Legal Regulation of Lethal Force, 13 YEARBOOK INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 3, 37–
38 (2010) [hereinafter Who May Be Killed?].
73. Supra Part II.B.
74. Supra Part II.A.
75. The reduced humanitarian protections are discussed infra Part III.B.1.
76. See Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War
on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2047, 2112–13 (2005); Karl Chang, Enemy Status and Military
Detention in the War Against al-Qaeda, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 1, 68 (2011).
77. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 76, at 2113.
78. Chang, supra note 76, at 32.
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to a conflict, the violating state becomes a co-belligerent and may be
targeted by the opposing party.79
This argument suffers from two major flaws. First, the law of
neutrality assumes that states are sovereign entities responsible for
their own actions when choosing to violate neutrality and enter a
conflict,80 but non-state actors do not have a duty to remain neutral
and may lawfully assist either party to a conflict.81 Second, because
the law of neutrality only applies to conflicts where both parties are
legitimate belligerents, the United States would have to recognize
al-Qaeda as a legitimate belligerent to invoke this body of law.82
Recognizing al-Qaeda as a legitimate belligerent would have the
collateral consequence of granting the combatant’s privilege to
al-Qaeda fighters.83 Currently, al-Qaeda militants may be prosecuted
for any acts committed in warfare because they do not have the
combatant’s privilege.84 However, the unintended result of invoking
the law of neutrality would be to confer the combatant’s privilege on
al-Qaeda fighters, effectively immunizing them from prosecution for
killing American soldiers in the course of warfare.85
Finally, some commentators have contended that any conflict
not falling within the category of IAC automatically becomes a
NIAC.86 Essentially, the term “NIAC” becomes a broad label
describing all armed conflict that is not waged between two states.87
Under this view, the United States’ conflict with al-Qaeda would
79. Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 76, at 2112–13.
80. See Pardiss Kebriaei, The Distance Between Principle and Practice in the Obama
Administration’s Targeted Killing Program: A Response to Jeh Johnson, 31 YALE L. & POL’Y
REV. 151, 162 (2012) (“[T]he law of neutrality . . . originated in the nineteenth century to regulate
the conduct of states during international armed conflict.”).
81. Kevin Jon Heller, The Law of Neutrality Does Not Apply to the Conflict Against Al
Qaeda, and It’s a Good Thing, Too: A Response to Chang, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 115, 132–33
(2011).
82. Id. at 124.
83. Id.
84. The combatant’s privilege does not apply in NIAC. Supra Part II.B.
85. See Heller, supra note 81, at 124. Of course, al-Qaeda fighters would still be subject to
prosecution for war crimes.
86. Roy S. Schondorf, Extra-State Armed Conflicts: Is There a Need For a New Legal
Regime, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 50 (2004) (“Recent scholarship offers an alternative
interpretation of common article 3, according to which it applies to all armed conflicts not falling
under common article 2, regardless of whether they occur within or outside the territory of the
high contracting party.”).
87. Chang, supra note 76, at 35 (“International armed conflict occurs between nations.
Non-international armed conflict is everything else, including wars between non-state actors and
wars by states against insurgents or terrorists.”).
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automatically be considered NIAC wherever it occurs because
al-Qaeda is not a state and is therefore incapable of engaging in IAC.
While the administration’s expansion of the conflict with al-Qaeda
would be warranted under this theory, it suffers from several flaws.
Interpreting “NIAC” as a default position encompassing all forms of
conflict that do not qualify as “IAC” is semantically convenient but
legally inaccurate because this view overlooks the fact that the term
“NIAC” has a specific legal definition.88 Under international law,
NIACs are defined as those conflicts occurring between a state and a
non-state actor within the boundaries of a single state,89 meaning
there is a geographic constraint inherent in the definition that
prevents a construal of NIAC as any conflict occurring anywhere in
the world that does not squarely fit within the IAC definition.
Furthermore, this view is problematic as it excludes the possibility
that another regime altogether, IHRL, could govern the fight against
al-Qaeda.
There is no legal support for construing the fight as a “global
war” with al-Qaeda and its affiliates. Rather, under current
international law, the most that the United States could be involved
in is a series of NIACs with non-state groups, with each conflict
confined to the territory of a single state. Thus, compliance with
international law requires an individual assessment of each country
where the United States is engaging in the conflict to determine
whether there are independent legal grounds for NIAC.90 Instead of
premising the use of LOAC on a broad, monolithic notion of a global
conflict with al-Qaeda and “associated forces,”91 this Article
proposes a framework that seeks to disaggregate the overall fight and
analyze each country independently to determine whether the
conditions satisfy the legal requirements for armed conflict.92
B. Adverse Consequences of the “Global War” Paradigm
Beyond the legal objections discussed above, there are practical
consequences that arise when the conflict against al-Qaeda is
classified as a “global war.” These consequences include: (1) fewer
88. The legal definition of NIAC is discussed supra Part II.B.
89. Geneva Conventions, supra note 20, art. 3.
90. The legal requirements for NIAC are: an armed attack and the existence of sufficient
organization and intensity (Tadic requirements). Supra Part II.B.
91. Obama National Security Speech, supra note 67.
92. Infra Part IV.

846

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:829

protections for civilians; (2) potential prosecution of American
soldiers; and (3) the target of “affiliated” groups that are unconnected
with the original conflict.
1. Fewer Protections for Civilians
One consequence that flows from treating the fight against
al-Qaeda as a global conflict is wider latitude for states to use lethal
force. The legal framework applicable during armed conflict, LOAC,
permits a more robust use of lethal force for states.93 Such latitude
does not exist in the law enforcement paradigm governed by IHRL.
For instance, a state engaged in armed conflict may target and kill
civilians directly participating in hostilities.94 Moreover, while
civilians who are not participating in hostilities may not be
intentionally targeted, they may be lawfully killed as “collateral
damage” from an attack, as long as the military advantage gained by
that attack is not excessively disproportionate to the amount of
civilian deaths.95
Outside the context of an armed conflict, none of the above
actions are legally permissible because IHRL applies.96 Under IHRL,
there is no provision for collateral damage, and the state generally
may not kill a civilian without first attempting arrest.97 When the
United States expands the conflict into new territories, it
automatically triggers the application of LOAC, providing fewer
protections for individuals.98 Numerous families and children have
been killed in Yemen,99 Pakistan,100 and Somalia101 because of the

93. The differences between LOAC and IHRL are discussed supra Part II.A.
94. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 20, art. 13(3) (“Civilians shall enjoy the protection
afforded by this [treaty], unless and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”).
95. See MANUAL ON LOAC, supra note 35, at 25 (“The principle of proportionality requires
that the losses resulting from a military action should not be excessive in relation to the expected
military advantage.”).
96. Supra Part II.A.
97. Pakistan Drone Report, supra note 1, at 44.
98. The more lenient provisions of LOAC are triggered when the conflict is expanded into
other territories because under the principle of lex specialis, LOAC, as the specific subset of rules
applicable in armed conflict, supersedes HRL when the two conflict. Supra Part II.A.
99. Civilian death estimates in Yemen range from eighty-four to one hundred. Compare
Drone Wars Yemen: Analysis, NEW AM. FOUND. (Nov. 25, 2013), http://natsec.newamerica.net
/drones/yemen/analysis, with Roggio & Barry, supra note 12.
100. Civilian death estimates in Pakistan range from 258 to 600. Compare Drone Wars
Pakistan: Analysis, NEW AM. FOUND. (Nov. 29, 2013), http://securitydata.newamerica.net/drones
/pakistan/analysis, with Statement of the Special Rapporteur Following Meetings in Pakistan,
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extension of the conflict against al-Qaeda and its affiliates into those
regions—these deaths are lawful as collateral damage only under
LOAC. Thus, the United States’ theory of a global conflict is
problematic because wherever the conflict extends, it is accompanied
by LOAC, which offers substantially less protection for innocent
civilians and increases the level of violence in territories that would
have otherwise remained free from hostilities.
2. Potential Prosecution of American Soldiers
Another consequence of the “global war” paradigm stems from
the concept of the combatant’s privilege. As discussed above, there is
no express treaty provision granting the combatant’s privilege to
fighters in NIAC.102 This raises the question: where do soldiers
acting on behalf of a state draw their authority to engage in acts of
warfare against non-state actors in NIAC? The answer is domestic
law; as a sovereign entity, the state operating within its own national
territory may immunize its own soldiers while also prosecuting the
“enemy” fighters under its domestic law.
Of course, this has implications for the United States, which is
engaged in NIAC in Afghanistan; as the sovereign state on whose
territory the conflict is taking place, only the government of
Afghanistan may immunize U.S. military personnel from domestic
prosecution for acts committed in the course of warfare.103 The
United States acquired this authorization in Afghanistan through the
2002 Status of Forces Agreement, in which the Afghan government
provided immunity for U.S. military personnel, granting permission
for the United States to exercise exclusive criminal jurisdiction over
its service members.104 But what happens when the United States
extends the conflict into other countries? Unless the United States
has similar agreements with the governments of these other
OFF. OF THE HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUM. RTS. (Mar. 14 2013), http://www.ohchr.org/EN
/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=13146&LangID=E./analysis.
101. Civilian death estimates in Somalia range from seven to forty-seven. US Covert Actions
in Somalia, THE BUREAU OF INVESTIGATIVE JOURNALISM, http://www.thebureauinvestigates
.com/category/projects/drones/drones-somalia/ (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
102. Supra Part II.B.
103. See id.
104. R. CHUCK MASON, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL 34531, STATUS OF FORCES
AGREEMENT (SOFA): WHAT IS IT, AND HOW HAS IT BEEN UTILIZED? 7–8 (2012), available at
http://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL34531.pdf (citing T.I.A.S. Exchange of notes September 26 and
December 12, 2002 and May 28, 2003. Entered into force May 28, 2003).
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countries, American soldiers could potentially face prosecution under
the domestic law of these countries for any act of violence they
commit.105 Currently, the United States has a Status of Forces
Agreement with Somalia, the scope of which is classified, but there
is no such agreement with either Pakistan or Yemen.106
3. Targeting “Affiliated” Groups Unconnected with the
Original Conflict
One final consequence arising from the “global war” paradigm
is that it can be used to justify the United States targeting so-called
“affiliated” groups with no connection to the original nexus of the
conflict against al-Qaeda. Just because an organization facially
appears to have ties to al-Qaeda does not mean it is sufficiently
associated to justify targeting in the current conflict.107 While it is
tempting to classify all groups preaching Islamic jihad as part and
parcel of al-Qaeda, that would be erroneous because many of these
groups had no role in the 9/11 attacks and do not share al-Qaeda’s
global outlook.108 In fact, since the conflict began, many of the
“affiliated” organizations that have sprouted actually maintain local
objectives directed at regional governments and are distinct from the
core al-Qaeda organization that launched attacks against the United
States on 9/11.109
Targeting groups that are ostensibly affiliated with al-Qaeda, but
have no connection to the nexus of the original conflict, gives rise to
two potential concerns—one legal and one practical. Legally, under
international law, the only armed attack justifying the United States’
resort to self-defense was perpetrated on 9/11 by al-Qaeda
originating in Afghanistan, which means that the legal justification
for engaging in armed conflict is inextricably linked to the 9/11

105. Interview with David Glazier, Int’l Law Professor, Loyola Law School, in L.A., Cal.
(Oct. 3, 2013).
106. See MASON, supra note 104, at 21–29.
107. DANIEL L. BYMAN, BREAKING THE BONDS BETWEEN AL-QA’IDA AND ITS AFFILIATE
ORGANIZATIONS 11 (2012) (“When a group begins to cooperate with al-Qa’ida, and even when a
group goes so far as to change its name to include the al-Qa’ida label, it does not automatically
become a branch of the core organization.”).
108. Id. at 34–35.
109. Peter Bergen, Op-Ed., From Benghazi to Boston: The State of Jihad, CNN (July 16,
2013, 2:15 PM), http://edition.cnn.com/2013/07/16/opinion/bergen-jihad-status/index.html.
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attacks.110 The concern is that the United States will rely on the
“global war” paradigm to target “affiliated” groups that are
disconnected from the nexus of the conflict, thereby exceeding the
original authorization to engage in armed conflict. For example,
when Syrian President Bashar al-Assad was rumored to have used
chemical weapons, some urged for United States intervention in
Syria predicated on the conflict with al-Qaeda.111 The proffered legal
rationale was that al-Qaeda militants had joined in the Syrian civil
war; therefore, the United States was authorized to attack in Syria
pursuant to its “global war” with al-Qaeda.112 The flaw in this
reasoning is that al-Qaeda’s activities in Syria, supporting the rebels
against the Assad regime, were completely disconnected from the
original nexus of the United States’ conflict.113
The practical concern is that targeting an “affiliated” group
without a connection to the original conflict might actually provide
incentive for that group to take up arms against the United States
where it otherwise would have remained focused on local
objectives.114 For instance, the United States has targeted, and
continues to target, the Somali organization al-Shabaab—a group
that maintains a predominantly regional agenda, that has no
connection to the 9/11 attacks, and that did not even exist when
al-Qaeda attacked the United States in 2001.115 Before a U.S. drone
110. In authorizing the United States to respond in self-defense, both the U.N. Security
Council Resolution and the NATO press release specifically refer to the 9/11 attacks. U.N.
Security Council Resolution, supra note 5; Press Release, NATO, supra note 57.
111. Marc Thiessen, Op-Ed., Don’t Just Bomb Assad. Bomb al-Qaeda, Too, WASH. POST
(Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/marc-thiessen-dont-just-bomb-assad
-bomb-al-qaeda-too/2013/09/09/5de2436a-195f-11e3-86855021e0c41964_story.html?wprss=rss
_opinions.
112. Id. (“[S]triking al-Qaeda in Syria would be lawful. We are already at war with al-Qaeda
and its associated forces around the world, and Congress has authorized the use of military force
against al-Qaeda.”).
113. Tim Lister, Al-Qaeda Advancing in Syria, One Town at a Time, CNN (Nov. 24, 2013,
9:08 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/11/24/world/meast/syria-al-qaeda-advances/ (demonstrating
that al-Qaeda’s goals in Syria are primarily local and focused on the takeover of the current
regime).
114. BYMAN, supra note 107, at 39 (“By lumping an unaffiliated group with al-Qa’ida, the
United States can drive it into [al-Qaeda’s] arms.”).
115. Hearing to Receive Testimony on The Law of Armed Conflict, the Use of Military Force,
and the 2001 Authorization for the Use of Military Force Before the S. Comm. On Armed
Services, 112th Cong. 31 (2013) [hereinafter AUMF Hearing] (statement of Rosa Brooks,
Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center) (“[W]e now appear . . . to be using armed
force against such entities as Somalia’s al Shabaab, which not only appears to have no connection
to the September 11 attacks, but does not appear, according to our own Director of National
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strike killed al-Shabaab’s leader in 2008, the group focused only on
regional objectives; however, since the 2008 attack, al-Shabaab has
engaged in numerous attacks against U.S. targets in Somalia and its
surrounding region.116
Overall, the consequences and legal analysis discussed above
reveal the practical risks and legal flaws inherent in a “global war”
paradigm. The proposed framework, presented in the next section,
seeks to disaggregate the conflict into its constituent parts and ensure
that there is an independent legal basis for engaging in armed
conflict within each region.
IV. PROPOSED FRAMEWORK
Politicians and scholars have put forth various proposals to
address the “global war” against al-Qaeda and its affiliates. One such
proposal is the “smart power” approach endorsed by former
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton.117 This approach seeks to harness
the power of diplomacy in a collaborative international effort to
address the root issues behind terrorism.118 In fact, there are
indications that a strategic diplomatic approach could play a large
part in deterring potential al-Qaeda affiliates from joining the fight
against the United States.119 However, this is a long-term solution
with its implementation still far off in the future.120 Additionally, the
United Nations is considering a comprehensive convention on
international terrorism.121 Such a convention could potentially
Intelligence, to pose any particular threat to the United States insofar as its ambitions are
primarily local.”); BYMAN, supra note 107, at 6–7.
116. Hearing to Receive Testimony on Al-Shabaab Recruitment in America Before the S.
Comm. On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 2 (2009) [hereinafter AlShabaab Hearing] (statement of Ken Menkhaus, Professor, Political Science, Davidson College,
North Carolina).
117. Howard LaFranchi, Hillary Clinton: More ‘Smart Power’ Needed in Terrorism Fight,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Sept. 9, 2011), http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2011
/0909/Hillary-Clinton-more-smart-power-needed-in-terrorism-fight; see also Koh, supra note 71,
at 7 (outlining diplomatic efforts in the Middle East).
118. LaFranchi, supra note 117; see also Koh, supra note 71, at 7.
119. See BYMAN, supra note 107, at 38–45 (“The United States and its allies should call
attention to al-Qa’ida’s repeated and bitter critiques of democracy, and more than this, should
advocate for political systems to be open to communities from which jihadists draw.”).
120. The U.N. Global Counterterrorism Forum was launched in September 2011, meaning
that the project is still relatively young and any meaningful change is still far off in the future.
LaFranchi, supra note 117.
121. INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, REPORT: INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
THE CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS 4, 48 (Oct. 2011) [hereinafter
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prescribe the rules for armed conflict against transnational non-state
groups; however, as this proposal has been under consideration for
the past decade and the treaty is yet to be concluded, any hope of
ratification or implementation is still in the distant future.122 Finally,
there are scholarly proposals to create a new type of conflict referred
to as “transnational” or “extra-state” armed conflict; this novel legal
regime would supplement IAC and NIAC.123 Once again, this final
proposal is still merely theoretical, and it remains to be seen when, or
if, such a concept will gain traction.
In due time, each of these proposals could potentially provide an
effective solution to the dangers raised by the “global war”
paradigm. However, until then, these dangers are urgent and require
an immediate approach rooted in existing law.
A. The Epicenter-of-Hostilities Approach
The solution is not to declare a “global war” as the Bush
administration did.124 Nor is the solution to target militants all across
the globe based on a monolithic notion of a broad armed conflict
against “al-Qaeda, the Taliban, and associated forces” as the Obama
administration has done.125 Instead, the “global war” must be
disaggregated into its constituent countries to determine if there is an
independent legal basis for the United States to engage in armed
conflict in each nation. An independent legal basis to engage in
armed conflict means there must have been an armed attack against
the United States,126 and the Tadic criteria of intensity and
organization must be satisfied.127 If all of these requirements are
satisfied in a specific nation, then it qualifies as an
epicenter-of-hostilities, and the United States may use force
CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS], available at http://www.icrc.org/eng
/resources/documents/report/31-international-conference-ihl-challenges-report-2011-10-31.htm.
122. Id.
123. See Geoffrey Corn and Eric Talbot Jensen, Transnational Armed Conflict: A
“Principled” Approach to the Regulation of Counter-Terror Combat Operations, 42 ISRAEL L.
REV. 46 (2009); Schondorf, supra note 86, at 5 (“[This] article calls for the creation of a new
category of armed conflict in international law for such situations—‘extra-state armed
conflict.’”).
124. Bush Memo, supra note 60, ¶ 2.a.
125. Obama National Security Speech, supra note 67.
126. U.N. Charter art. 51.
127. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-I, Decision on Defence Motion for
Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 70 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Oct. 2,
1995).

852

LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 48:829

consistent with LOAC against al-Qaeda or its affiliates in that nation,
so long as the Tadic conditions continue to be satisfied. This
approach will be illustrated by analyzing the four countries where the
United States is currently waging the conflict against al-Qaeda and
its affiliates: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia.
1. Afghanistan
In October 2001, the United States launched OEF Operation
Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan against the Taliban and
al-Qaeda.128 Originally, this conflict began as an IAC between the
United States and the Taliban, but by December 9, 2001, the Taliban
government had toppled.129 The dismantling of the Taliban
government did not automatically transform the conflict from IAC to
NIAC. Because NIAC takes place between a state and a non-state
actor in the sovereign territory of that state, there must be a sovereign
Afghan regime before the conflict can legally be deemed NIAC.130
The establishment of the Karzai regime as the sovereign
government131 functioned to convert the conflict from IAC to NIAC,
pitting the United States and the Afghan government against the
Taliban and al-Qaeda.132
The requisite legal criteria were satisfied in Afghanistan to
declare the situation an armed conflict. First, the 9/11 events
constituted an armed attack sufficient to allow the United States to
respond in self-defense.133 Second, the Tadic requirements were also
satisfied. Both the Taliban and al-Qaeda were sufficiently organized
with command structures and the ability to plan and execute military
operations.134 The intensity requirement was satisfied as evidenced
by the use of military weapons, spread of clashes over large expanse
128. KENNETH KATZMAN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL30588, AFGHANISTAN: POSTTALIBAN GOVERNANCE, SECURITY, AND U.S. POLICY 8 (2013).
129. Id.
130. Geneva Conventions, supra note 20, art. 3.
131. KATZMAN, supra note 128, at 10.
132. CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 121, at 10
(explaining that the conflict in Afghanistan originated as IAC but morphed into NIAC).
133. Both NATO and the United Nations Security Council recognized the events of 9/11 as
an armed attack. U.N. Security Council Resolution, supra note 5; Press Release, NATO, supra
note 57.
134. See MARK DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A PROFILE OF 517
DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA 16 (2005) (explaining the
organization of the Taliban); BYMAN, supra note 107, at 11–13 (explaining the organizational
structure of al-Qaeda in Afghanistan).
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of territory, and thousands of fatalities.135 Furthermore, after the
Taliban government was ousted, the United States received
authorization from the new Karzai regime in 2002 to operate “in
connection with cooperative efforts in response to terrorism,
humanitarian and civic assistance, military training and exercises,
and other activities.”136 This authorization was crucial because the
United States was now engaged in an NIAC on the sovereign
territory of another state, with Afghanistan functioning as the
lead legal actor.137 Thus, Afghanistan clearly qualifies as an
epicenter-of-hostilities because the conditions indicate an
independent legal basis to conduct an armed conflict within the state.
2. Pakistan
In Pakistan, the United States has focused the majority of its
attacks in the North Waziristan region that borders Afghanistan.138
Notably absent from the discussion of targeted groups in Pakistan is
an al-Qaeda branch or a group carrying the “al-Qaeda” moniker.139
Instead, the United States has primarily devoted its attention and
resources to three main groups: Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), the
Haqqani network, and Lashkar-e Taiba (LT).140
TTP, also known as the Pakistani Taliban, formed in 2007 to
unify various militant groups combating the Pakistani government.141
TTP has been responsible for attacks on domestic military and
intelligence targets as well as two high-profile attacks: one attack in
2007 that killed former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, and
another in 2013 that seriously injured Malala Yousafazi, a teenager

135. Casualties: Afghanistan, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/war.casualties/ (last
updated Dec. 12, 2013).
136. MASON, supra note 104, at 27 tbl.7.
137. In NIACs, only the state operating within its own national territory may immunize its
own soldiers while also prosecuting the “enemy” fighters under its domestic law. Thus, in OEF,
which was NIAC against al-Qaeda and the Taliban, only Afghanistan could provide immunity for
U.S. soldiers under its domestic law. Supra Part III.B.2.
138. Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis, supra note 100.
139. See Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Homeland Threat Landscape and U.S.
Response Before the S. Comm. On Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 2
(2013) [hereinafter Homeland Threat Hearing] (statement of Matthew G. Olsen, Director,
National Counterterrorism Center); BYMAN, supra note 107, at 10 (accounting for the absence of
an al-Qaeda branch in Pakistan).
140. See Homeland Threat Hearing, supra note 139, at 2–3;
141. Tehrik-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP), NAT’L COUNTERTERRORISM CENTER,
http://www.nctc.gov/site/groups/ttp.html (last visited Dec. 12, 2013).
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advocating for the education of girls.142 In August 2009, a U.S. drone
strike killed Baitullah Mehsud, then-leader of TTP, and
approximately one year later, in September 2010, the United States
designated TTP as a foreign terrorist organization.143 In another
instance, on November 1, 2013, the United States launched a drone
strike killing Hakimullah Mehsud, TTP’s newest leader.144
LT has been active since 1993 and has claimed responsibility for
numerous attacks on the India-Pakistan border.145 In 2002, LT was
banned from Pakistan and, since that time, has not admitted
responsibility for any attacks.146 However, officials believe that LT
was responsible for the deadly Mumbai attacks of 2008 that claimed
hundreds of lives.147 Overall, LT’s goals are primarily focused on the
South East Asian region; specifically, the group opposes improving
relations between India and Pakistan.148 The group has been
suspected of supporting the Afghan al-Qaeda organization in various
capacities.149
The Haqqani network has been in existence since the mid-1970s,
with a major presence in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.150 The
group is one of the most dangerous and capable fighting units in
Afghanistan, and it has carried out numerous attacks against United
States and coalition forces in Afghanistan.151 On November 21,
2013, the United States launched a drone strike in Pakistan, killing
the Haqqani network’s second in command.152

142. Carlotta Gall and Declan Walsh, How the Pakistani Taliban Became a Deadly Force,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/02/world/asia/how-the-pakistani
-taliban-became-a-deadly-force.html?_r=0.
143. Id.
144. M Ilyas Khan, What Next for Pakistani Taliban After Hakimullah Death?, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 1, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-24781033.
145. Jayshree Bajoria, Lashkar-e Taiba, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Jan. 14, 2010),
http://www.cfr.org/pakistan/lashkar-e-taiba-army-pure-aka-lashkar-e-tayyiba-lashkar-e-toiba
-lashkar--taiba/p17882.
146. Id.
147. See id.
148. Homeland Threat Hearing, supra note 139, at 3.
149. Bajoria, supra note 145.
150. See DON RASSLER & VAHID BROWN, COMBATING TERRORISM CTR. AT W. POINT, THE
HAQQANI NEXUS AND THE EVOLUTION OF AL-QAI’DA 1–2 (July 14, 2011).
151. See Jeffrey Dressler, INST. FOR THE STUDY OF WAR, THE HAQQANI NETWORK: A
STRATEGIC THREAT 15–18 (Mar. 2012), available at http://www.understandingwar.org/sites
/default/files/Haqqani_Network_0.pdf.
152. Mushtaq Yusufzai, Drone Strike Kills Haqqani Network’s No. 2, Other Taliban
Commanders, NBC NEWS (Nov. 21, 2013, 8:35 AM), http://worldnews.nbcnews.com/_news
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Between 2004 and 2014, the United States carried out between
354153 and 370154 strikes against these groups in Pakistan. Under the
epicenter-of-hostilities analysis, the conditions in Pakistan must
independently satisfy the legal criteria for armed conflict for the
United States to conduct its activities pursuant to LOAC.155 With
three distinct groups in Pakistan, it is important to note that the
existence of NIAC against one group does not provide authority for
the United States to target the other groups.156 Hypothetically, if the
legal criteria for armed conflict were satisfied against LT, the United
States would be limited to conducting military operations only
against LT and could not attack TTP premised on that NIAC.157
The Tadic criteria of intensity and organization appear to be
satisfied for all three groups: each group is sufficiently organized
with a command structure and has demonstrated an ability to
coordinate and execute military operations, causing substantial
destruction and hundreds of deaths.158 The final consideration is
whether there has been an armed attack against the United States to
justify an armed conflict in Pakistan. None of the aforementioned
groups has attempted an attack on the United States’ homeland.
However, militants belonging to the Haqqani network have carried
out high-profile attacks in Afghanistan and fled into remote Pakistani
border regions.159 Some scholars have argued that LOAC authorizes
/2013/11/21/21558669-drone-strike-kills-haqqani-networks-no-2-other-taliban-commanders
-officials.
153. Bill Roggio & Alexander Mayer, Charting the Data for US Airstrikes in Pakistan,
2004–2014, LONG WAR J. (Dec. 25, 2013, 11:54 AM), http://www.longwarjournal.org/Pakistan
-strikes.php.
154. Drone Wars Pakistan: Analysis, supra note 100.
155. Supra Part IV.A.
156. Under LOAC, parties to a conflict must adhere to the principle of distinction, which
dictates that only combatants may be targeted in an armed conflict. MANUAL ON LOAC, supra
note 35, at 24. If the United States were hypothetically engaged in NIAC against LT, the principle
of distinction would mandate that only members of LT may be targeted as combatants.
157. If, however, TTP or the Haqqani network decided to join the hypothetical NIAC between
the United States and LT, there is ample legal authority allowing the United States to attack the
additional group. See Additional Protocol II, supra note 20, art. 4(1) (providing authority to target
individuals directly participating in hostilities in NIAC); CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY
ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 121, at 9 (explaining that NIAC can occur between a state and
multiple non-state actors).
158. See Gall & Walsh, supra note 142 (describing TTP’s organization structure and violent
attacks); Bajoria, supra note 145 (describing LT’s organization structure and violent attacks);
Dressler, supra note 151 (describing the Haqqani network’s organization structure and violent
attacks).
159. Dressler, supra note 151, at 15–17.
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the United States to extend the armed conflict into Pakistan to avoid
a situation where non-state actors fighting in Afghanistan simply
cross the border into Pakistan and are no longer subject to
targeting.160 As a practical matter, international law allows only for
extremely limited uses of force against actually imminent threats
where a state is unable or unwilling to enforce its obligation to
prevent its territory from being used to the detriment of another
state.161 So if the Pakistani government is unwilling to deal with the
spillover from the Afghanistan conflict, the United States may
respond with force against imminent threats, but may not use that as
a premise to extend the armed conflict. Thus, because Pakistan does
not satisfy the requisite legal criteria for armed conflict, the United
States is limited to law enforcement operations when operating in
this region, with the caveat that military force may be used in
response to imminent threats.
3. Yemen
In Yemen, the United States is combating the group al-Qaeda in
the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP is a blend of the Saudi and
Yemeni branches of al-Qaeda. The Saudi branch of al-Qaeda was
established after 9/11 and began attacking Western and local targets
in 2003, but the group was ousted from Saudi Arabia in 2006 after
falling out of favor with the local Muslim population.162 In Yemen,
another group, known as al-Qaeda Yemen (AQY), was established in
1998.163 AQY was responsible for the attack on the USS Cole in
2000 and multiple attacks on foreign tourists and Western targets
between 2006 and 2008.164 In 2009, the remnants of the banished
Saudi group merged with AQY to form the present-day AQAP.165
AQAP’s agenda has been predominantly regional, with attacks
directed mainly at local government and Western targets within

160. See Jennifer C. Daskal, The Geography of the Battlefield: A Framework for Detention
and Targeting Outside the “Hot” Conflict Zone, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1165, 1174 (2013).
161. See Theresa Reinold, State Weakness, Irregular Warfare, and the Right to Self-Defense
Post-9/11, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 244, 248 (2011) (explaining the limited authority states have in the
absence of armed conflict to respond in self-defense to imminent threats).
162. BYMAN, supra note 107, at 5–6.
163. Yemen Drone Report, supra note 12, at 12.
164. Id. at 12–13.
165. Id. at 13.
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Yemen.166 Despite its primarily local aims, AQAP has attempted
several attacks on the United States’ homeland.167 In 2009, AQAP
claimed responsibility for a foiled terror attack where a Nigerian man
unsuccessfully attempted to detonate explosives in his underwear
aboard a flight carrying 289 people en route to Detroit.168 In October
2010, parcel bombs were found on cargo planes destined for the
United States—an attack that was attributed to AQAP.169 Most
recently, in May 2012, the CIA thwarted an attempt by AQAP to
attack another flight bound for the United States using an enhanced
version of the 2009 underwear bomb.170 The United States has
carried out between eighty-three171 and ninety-six172 strikes against
AQAP in Yemen by drones, warplanes, or cruise missiles. Only one
of these attacks was launched in 2002 by the Bush administration,
while the remaining strikes have occurred since 2009 at the direction
of the Obama administration.173
Under the epicenter-of-hostilities approach, the situation in
Yemen must be examined to determine whether the conditions
independently satisfy the legal criteria for armed conflict. AQAP
appears to be sufficiently organized, as it maintains a command
structure174 and has demonstrated an ability to coordinate and
execute military operations.175 The intensity criterion also seems to
be satisfied. Although every attack against the United States’
homeland has been derailed, AQAP’s campaign within Yemen has

166. Jonathan Masters and Zachary Laub, Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP),
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Aug. 22, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/yemen/al-qaeda-arabian
-peninsula-aqap/p9369.
167. Id.
168. Chris Harnisch, Christmas Day Attack: Manifestation of AQAP Shift Targeting America,
AEI CRITICAL THREAT (Dec. 29, 2009), http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/christmas-day
-attack-manifestation-aqap-shift-targeting-america.
169. Yemen Profile: Al-Qaeda in Action, BBC NEWS (Oct. 26, 2013), http://www.bbc.co.uk
/news/world-middle-east-14704951.
170. CIA ‘Foiled al-Qaida Bomb Plot’ Around Anniversary of Bin Laden Death, THE
GUARDIAN (May 7, 2012), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/may/07/cia-al-qaida-bomb
-plot.
171. Drone Wars Yemen: Analysis, supra note 99.
172. Roggio & Barry, supra note 12.
173. Yemen Drone Report, supra note 12, at 18.
174. Id. at 13–14; Who May Be Killed?, supra note 72, at 32.
175. This is evidenced not only by the three aforementioned attacks on the U.S. homeland,
but also by the ongoing campaign against the Yemeni government.
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utilized military weapons, caused substantial destruction, and
resulted in hundreds of deaths.176
The final consideration in the epicenter-of-hostilities analysis is
whether there has been an armed attack against the United States to
trigger the use of force pursuant to LOAC. AQAP has attempted
three attacks against the United States.177 At first glance, it is
tempting to consider these attacks a sufficient legal premise to
declare armed conflict against AQAP; however, historically only one
terror attack in modern times has ever been deemed an armed attack
sufficient to trigger the self-defense provision of the U.N.
Charter178—the 9/11 attack by al-Qaeda, which resulted in over
3,000 deaths.179 Here, the combined potential casualty count of all
three attacks by AQAP is in the low to mid hundreds,180 which falls
far below the devastating death toll of 9/11. Furthermore, since 9/11,
similar terrorist attacks have not been construed as armed attacks
sufficient to trigger an armed conflict but simply as terrorist attacks
subject to IHRL law enforcement provisions.181 These attacks
include the Madrid train bombing in 2004, which resulted in 192
deaths and over 1,400 injuries,182 and the London subway bombing
in 2005, which resulted in fifty-two deaths and over 700 injuries.183
Thus, AQAP’s attacks against the United States do not satisfy the
armed attack requirement, meaning that there is no independent legal
basis for engaging in armed conflict against AQAP in Yemen.

176. Yemen Drone Report, supra note 12, at 15 (“Inside Yemen, AQAP’s primary targets are
Yemeni government security and foreigners. The group’s attacks have killed hundreds of
government military and intelligence personnel.”).
177. See Harnisch, supra note 168; Yemen Profile: Al-Qaeda in Action, supra note 169; CIA
‘Foiled al-Qaida Bomb Plot’ Around Anniversary of Bin Laden Death, supra note 170.
178. See INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 13, at 25.
179. September 11 Anniversary Fast Facts, CNN (Sept. 11, 2013, 11:01 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2013/07/27/us/september-11-anniversary-fast-facts/.
180. The 2009 and 2012 attacks were directed against airliners carrying between 250–300
people each, whereas the 2010 attack was directed against a cargo plane. Had these attacks
succeeded, the death toll would have been in the low to mid hundreds. See Harnisch, supra note
168; Yemen Profile: Al-Qaeda in Action, supra note 169; CIA ‘Foiled al-Qaida Bomb Plot’
Around Anniversary of Bin Laden Death, supra note 170.
181. INT’L LAW ASS’N, supra note 13, at 25.
182. Elaine Sciolino, Spain Struggles to Absorb Worst Terrorist Attack in Its History, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 11, 2004, http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/11/international/europe/11CND-TRAI
.html.
183. July 7 2005 London Bombing Fast Facts, CNN (Nov. 6, 2013, 4:36 PM), http://
www.cnn.com/2013/11/06/world/europe/july-7-2005-london-bombings-fast-facts/.

Spring 2015]

THE BOUNDLESS WAR

859

There is another basis on which the United States could premise
its military operations in Yemen, which depends on the degree of
connectedness between the al-Qaeda core and AQAP. If AQAP were
part and parcel of the al-Qaeda core that attacked the United States
on 9/11, then the United States would be entitled to consider the 9/11
attacks as the armed attack necessary to engage in hostilities against
AQAP.184 Examining AQAP’s lineage lends strong support to this
argument, as both the Saudi branch of al-Qaeda and AQY, the two
groups that merged to form AQAP, were directly linked to the
al-Qaeda core. Osama Bin Laden personally established the Saudi
branch of al-Qaeda185 and worked directly with Abd al Rahim al
Nashiri, then head of AQY, to plan the 2000 USS Cole bombing.186
Furthermore, Nasser Karim al-Wuhayish, the leader who oversaw the
merger between the Saudi group and AQY to create AQAP, had
served as the “personal assistant” to Osama Bin Laden in the
1990s.187
Despite the interwoven histories of AQAP and the al-Qaeda
core, the two organizations maintain differing agendas,188 and it
appears that the al-Qaeda core is not superior to AQAP in a
command hierarchy.189 Overall, it is unclear whether AQAP is an
independent organization that merely collaborates with al-Qaeda’s
core, or part and parcel of the al-Qaeda core. However, there is
enough evidence to make a plausible argument that AQAP is a
branch of the al-Qaeda core, which would provide authority for the
United States to conduct operations consistent with LOAC in Yemen
based on 9/11 being the requisite armed attack.190

184. Because the United States was authorized to declare armed conflict against al-Qaeda in
response to the 9/11 attacks, it stands to reason that if AQAP was part and parcel of the al-Qaeda
core, then the authorization for armed conflict would encompass AQAP as an enemy.
185. BYMAN, supra note 107, at 5, 12.
186. Who May Be Killed?, supra note 72, at 7.
187. Id.
188. See BYMAN, supra note 107, at 12 (“Even AQAP, often touted as the affiliate closest to
al-Qa’ida because it has attempted attacks on American civil aviation . . . still concentrates
primarily on targets within Yemen itself.”).
189. Who May Be Killed?, supra note 72, at 8 (“AQAP appears to operate without direct lines
of control running to bin Laden or other senior al Qaeda leaders.”).
190. Because the NIAC against AQAP is occurring on Yemen’s sovereign territory, Yemen is
the lead legal actor, and the United States must seek authorization from the Yemeni government
to engage in military operations. Supra Parts II.B, III.B.2.
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4. Somalia
In Somalia, the United States has primarily targeted al-Shabaab,
a terrorist group that originated as a military wing of a larger group
known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU), which took control of
Somalia in 2006.191 After taking power, the ICU engaged in a
devastating conflict with neighboring Ethiopia that lasted until
2009.192 In the course of this conflict, al-Shabaab broke away from
ICU and emerged as the strongest militia force in southern Somalia,
controlling a substantial amount of territory by mid-2008.193 In
March 2008, the United States designated al-Shabaab a terrorist
organization and, three months later, launched a Tomahawk missile
on a safe house in Somalia, killing al-Shabaab’s leader.194 This attack
by the United States prompted the group to respond by announcing
that it would begin targeting U.N. and U.S. targets within Somalia.195
In October 2008, al-Shabaab launched five synchronized attacks
against local government, Ethiopian targets, and U.N. compounds in
northern Somalia.196 The first attack perpetrated outside Somalia
occurred in March 2010, when al-Shabaab executed coordinated
suicide bombings that killed seventy-four spectators watching the
World Cup in Uganda.197 In February 2012, al-Shabaab officially
swore allegiance to al-Qaeda.198 Another al-Shabaab attack occurred
in September 2013 in Nairobi, Kenya, where sixty-eight people were
killed in a deadly assault.199
Al-Shabaab’s goals are primarily regional, and it has never
attempted an attack on the United States.200 Under international law,
the requisite conditions for armed conflict must be satisfied before
the United States may apply LOAC against al-Shabaab in Somalia.
Turning to the Tadic requirements, it appears that al-Shabaab is
191. Al-Shabaab Hearing, supra note 116, at 2.
192. Id. at 3–4.
193. Jonathan Masters, Al-Shabab, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Sept. 23, 2013),
http://www.cfr.org/somalia/al-shabab/p18650#p3.
194. Al-Shabaab Hearing, supra note 116, at 5–6.
195. Id. at 6.
196. Id.
197. Q&A: Who Are Somalia’s al-Shabab?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 24, 2013, 7:06 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-15336689.
198. Id.
199. Id.
200. See Harold Maass, Could al-Shabab Launch a Terrorist Attack in the U.S.?, THE WK.
(Sept. 24, 2013), http://theweek.com/article/index/250066/could-al-shabab-launch-a-terrorist
-attack-in-the-us.
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sufficiently organized, as evidenced by its ability to launch
coordinated strikes, speak with one voice when swearing allegiance
to al-Qaeda, and maintain a command hierarchy.201 The intensity
requirement also appears to be satisfied, as the various attacks in
Somalia, Uganda, and Kenya involved military weapons, resulted in
high casualty counts, and caused substantial destruction.202 However,
al-Shabaab has never attacked the United States; in fact, to the extent
that there is any armed conflict between al-Shabaab and the United
States, the United States unilaterally initiated it203 and continues to
perpetuate it by launching attacks in Somalia.204 Thus, it appears that
there is no independent legal basis for engaging in armed conflict
with al-Shabaab in Somalia, and the United States must comply with
the rules of IHRL when operating in the region.
Countries that do not qualify as an epicenter-of-hostilities should
be regulated by a law enforcement model.205 There is a robust array
of options available for holding terrorists criminally liable under U.S.
domestic law.206 In fact, hundreds of terrorists are currently held in
federal prisons throughout the United States.207 Even the Obama
administration has touted the efficacy of civilian courts to prosecute
terrorism suspects.208
V. IMPLICATIONS
Overall, the epicenter-of-hostilities framework mitigates the
adverse consequences of the “global war” paradigm.209 First, limiting
LOAC to the epicenter-of-hostilities means that the United States
will be operating pursuant to IHRL in all other countries. IHRL
201. BYMAN, supra note 107, at 6–7; Masters, supra note 193.
202. Q&A: Who Are Somalia’s al-Shabab?, supra note 197.
203. Masters, supra note 193.
204. US Covert Actions in Somalia, supra note 101.
205. David Glazier, Playing by the Rules: Combating Al Qaeda Within the Law of War, 51
WM. & MARY L. REV. 957, 967–72 (2009) (explaining how terrorist acts can be prosecuted under
criminal law).
206. See Robert M. Chesney, Terrorism, Criminal Prosecution, and the Preventive Detention
Debate, 50 S. TEX. L. REV. 669, 675–87 (2009) (describing the different legal bases for
prosecuting terrorists under U.S. domestic law).
207. Josh Gerstein, Senate Panel Weighs Plans to Close Guantanamo, POLITICO (July 24,
2013, 4:36 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2013/07/guantanamo-closing-plans-94693.html.
208. Obama National Security Speech, supra note 67 (“Our courts have convicted hundreds
of people for terrorism or terrorism-related offenses, including some folks who are more
dangerous than most [Guantanamo] detainees. They’re in our prisons.”).
209. Supra Part III.B.
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imposes more stringent requirements on the use of lethal force than
LOAC,210 which means innocent civilians, in the regions where
groups affiliated with al-Qaeda operate, will receive more
protection.211 Second, confining LOAC to the epicenter-of-hostilities
narrows the scope of countries in which the United States will be
conducting military operations, which reduces the likelihood that
American soldiers will engage in NIAC in a territory without
authorization from the government, thereby avoiding potential
prosecution under the domestic laws of that state.212 Finally, the
epicenter-of-hostilities approach eradicates the risk of targeting
affiliated groups with no connection to the original conflict because
each region must satisfy the requisite criteria for armed conflict,
meaning there will be an independent legal basis for attacking that is
not contingent on the original attack of 9/11.213
Additionally, the epicenter-of-hostilities framework has three
major implications for the United States. First and foremost, the
adverse consequences of the “global war” paradigm have tarnished
the United States’ image as a champion of human rights,214 which in
turn has alienated current allies215 and incited terrorist groups—who
would have otherwise remained focused on local objectives—to take
up arms against the United States.216 The road to restoring the United
States’ image as a champion of human rights and rehabilitating its
relationships with allies begins by complying with existing law. This
Article’s proposal ensures that the United States’ conduct in the
conflict with al-Qaeda and its affiliates will conform to existing law,
thereby preventing the practices that have been the subject of
international and domestic criticism.217

210. CHALLENGES OF CONTEMPORARY ARMED CONFLICTS, supra note 121, at 18–19.
211. Supra Part III.B.1.
212. Supra Part III.B.2.
213. Supra Part III.B.3.
214. Daskal, supra note 160, at 1232 (“[It] becomes difficult for the United States to [remain
a champion of human rights] when viewed as supporting broad-based law-of-war authority that
gives it wide latitude to employ force as a first resort and bypass otherwise applicable human
rights and domestic law enforcement norms.”).
215. AUMF Hearing, supra note 115, at vii (“[A]t the moment we are risking alienating some
of our key European allies whose view of the applicable international law is very different from
ours . . . .”); Obama Nobel Speech, supra note 8 (explaining that certain aspects of the conflict
against al-Qaeda have alienated key allies in the fight against terrorism).
216. Byman, supra note 107, at 39.
217. Supra Parts III.B.1–3.
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The second implication is how the United States will treat other
affiliated groups. For example, the United States recently designated
the group Boko Haram as a foreign terrorist organization, alleging
that it has ties to al-Shabaab and other militant jihadist groups.218
Boko Haram formed in 2002 as a group promoting Islamic education
and worship; however, since 2009, the group has committed a series
of devastating attacks throughout the country of Nigeria.219
Similarly, the United States has deemed the group al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) as a foreign terrorist organization.220
AQIM operates primarily in North Africa, maintaining footholds in
Niger and Mali.221 In 2007, AQIM officially swore allegiance to
al-Qaeda and began launching attacks against local and Western
targets in the region, mainly in Algeria and Mauritania.222 While the
United States has not yet taken any military action against either
group, the epicenter-of-hostilities approach provides a framework for
determining the legality of any potential attacks directed against
these groups. The United States may only engage in armed conflict
and carry out operations pursuant to LOAC if the requisite legal
criteria are satisfied such that each of these countries is considered an
epicenter-of-hostilities—the group has attacked the United States and
the Tadic requirements of intensity and organization are met.
The final implication is the United States’ role in shaping
customary international law.223 Because the conflict against al-Qaeda
is the first time the international community has ever recognized an
armed conflict against a modern terrorist organization, there is not
much definitive state practice on the topic and certainly not enough
to establish customary international law.224 The United States is on
the forefront of state practice in these types of conflicts;
218. Moses Rono, Boko Haram: Is Terror Designation a Badge of Honor?, BBC NEWS
(Nov. 15, 2013, 9:20 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24959207.
219. Farouk Chothia, Who Are Nigeria’s Boko Haram Islamists?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 11, 2012,
11:30 AM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13809501.
220. Jonathan Masters, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.
(Jan. 24, 2013), http://www.cfr.org/world/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717.
221. Id.
222. Al-Qai’da in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), NATIONAL
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consequently, the administration’s actions set a significant precedent
that can mold state conduct in the future.225 The danger of setting a
precedent based on a “global war” paradigm is that states in the
future may abuse the wider latitude for lethal force and completely
disregard humanitarian protections in the course of conducting
hostilities against transnational, non-state enemies.226 Over time, if
states continue to follow this lead, they may develop a belief that
they are entitled to declare a “global war” in such situations, which
could give rise to a disturbing, new customary international law.227 In
fact, the United States would not have much standing to object to the
development of such practices if it is perceived as the forerunner of
the “global war” paradigm.228 There is still an opportunity, while
these conflicts are relatively new, to set a course grounded in
humanitarian guarantees and respect for existing law.
VI. CONCLUSION
The events of September 11 challenged the sufficiency of the
established international/non-international armed conflict dichotomy
to govern a novel conflict against an unprecedented enemy. In the
words of one Obama administration official, the United States has
endeavored to conduct this unconventional conflict using
“conventional legal principles found in treaties and customary
international law.”229 Unfortunately, the United States has missed the
mark, insisting on a “global war” paradigm that is not supported by
existing law and pursuing a course of action that has resulted in
adverse consequences for innocent civilians and could potentially
subject American military personnel to prosecution in the conflict
regions.230
225. Daskal, supra note 160, at 1174 (“[T]he United States is the first state to self-consciously
declare itself at war with a non-state terrorist organization that potentially spans the globe.”).
226. AUMF Hearing, supra note 115, at 38 (statement of Kenneth Roth, Exec. Dir., Human
Rights Watch) (“I am concerned . . . about the precedents that the U.S. Government sets for other
governments that may have much less attention to the rights of their citizens or others.”).
227. Marco Sassoli, “Unlawful Combatants”: The Law and Whether It Needs to be Revised,
97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 196, 199 (2003) (“[L]ess scrupulous states may take advantage of
such a new loophole in the carefully built-up protective system offered by the Geneva
Conventions by, for example, denying protection to U.S. personnel.”).
228. Obama Nobel Speech, supra note 8 (“America—in fact, no nation—can insist that others
follow the rules of the road if we refuse to follow them ourselves. For when we don’t, our actions
appear arbitrary and undercut the legitimacy of future interventions, no matter how justified.”).
229. Johnson, supra note 65.
230. Supra Part III.
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Fortunately, it is not too late to change course and implement a
framework rooted in existing law, which can be accomplished by
applying the epicenter-of-hostilities approach.231 The epicenter-ofhostilities approach seeks to determine whether a particular region
satisfies the requisite criteria for armed conflict, providing an
independent legal basis for the United States to engage in armed
conflict.232 Implementing this approach would ensure that the United
States’ conduct adheres to existing law, thereby preventing the
conduct that has been the subject of criticism from the international
community.233 The administration’s actions today have wide-ranging
implications for America’s image in the immediate future and state
practice in the distant future.234 The legacy of the conflict against
al-Qaeda and its affiliates is presently being formed, and the United
States has a closing window of time to leave a legacy of tempered,
responsible military action and respect for existing law.
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